Per Serritslev Peterson’s “Jack London’s Medusa of Truth” (Philosophy and Literature 26.1) challenges our ideas about the notoriously eclectic and idiosyncratic philosophical thought of Jack London, a.k.a. “The Boy Socialist,” a.k.a. “The Adolescent Nietzschean,” a.k.a. “The College Spencerian,” a.k.a. “The Middle-Aged Nietzschean Socialist,” a.k.a. “The Forty Year-Old Jungian.” Despite bouncing from one hermetically-sealed-but-internally-coherent philosophical system to another for the majority of his short life, Peterson insists that London’s critics misconstrue the nature of his philosophical questing. So he gathers London’s little truthlets and declares
London as philosopher 1) was a Nietzschean dialectician who mastered and negotiated the juxtaposition of conflicting ideas, perspectives, and values in life (the Medusa-Maya dichotomy being a crucial case in point); and who consequently, 2) possessed philosophical authenticity and integrity, or what Nietzsche terms “intellectual conscience."
I generally applaud counter-intuitive readings. When Peterson identifies his as being such a beast, stating that his “contentions must appear highly questionable in contemporary American academe,” he implicates his article in the storied tradition which, as just noted, I generally applaud. However, the second clause of that sentence baffles me: “seeing that very few London scholars or critics take the novelist’s philosophy seriously.” Most London scholars not only take one of his philosophical positions seriously, they construct elaborate channels through which they can safely navigate three or four of them. Peterson’s argument is counter-intuitive in an artificial and synthetic fashion...and in this sense resembles those London himself favored. In short, then, Peterson’s consistency fetish neatly doubles London’s own; furthermore, it blinds him to the inconsistencies of his work much as London’s blinded him to the inconsistencies in his. That said, Peterson’s performance easily outshines London’s clunky stabs at synthesis; it is, to be frank, a bravura performance on Peterson’s part. But I still don’t buy a word of it.
Then there’s the case of James Berger, a man I treated unfairly in a brief post about what I (mistakenly) believed to be an (unintentionally) infelicitous pair of sentences. In “Falling Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo and Turns Against Language” (PMLA 120.2), Berger discusses the work of Oliver Sacks as a singular body of thought, consistent throughout, be he writing for a popular audience in The New York Review of Books or the scientific community in Neurology. (Now, I admit that Sacks is not the best example, since as I’ve skimmed some of his scientific writing he seems more consistent than someone like Steven Pinker. But bear with me, since I’m not here to bury Berger, but praise him.) For Berger, Sacks’ theory of a pre-linguistic subjectivity--accessible through interaction with highly acculturated aesthetic objects like symphonies and modernist poetry--exists in equal measure in his popular and scientific thought.
I would argue that a savvy rhetorician like Sacks would recognize the ideological investments of his audience and pitch his presentations to them: hence his references to patients cured by Beethoven, pains ameliorated by Mahler and people reborn through Brahms. I doubt those staples of NPR appear as frequently in his scientific papers like, say, “Cycad Neurotoxins, Consumption of Flying Foxes, and ALS-PDC Disease in Guam.” Those references say as much about the audience a popular science writer like Sacks keys his performance to please as it does about his own thought on the matter. (Or not. This is why Sacks is a bad example of this general phenomenon.) Here’s the thing: Berger’s argument would be strenghtened were he to turn from what Sacks believes to what Sacks’ audience believes. He need not worry about Sacks, or whether Sacks’ scientific work jives with his popular, because the rhetoric of his popular work--in which he appeals to an idea of a pre-linguistic subjectivity accessible through highly acculturated aesthetic objects--proves Berger’s point more powerfully by dint of its popularity. He need not focus on Sacks’ personal beliefs to deliver his argument convincingly.












[I swear I didn't post this for the title alone. Sometimes comments just deserve to be posts, and since Rich doesn't have a blog of his own I'm the one duty-bound to do the elevating. What follows is the coda to his conversation with Jonathan. I don't necessarily agree with all of it (to be specific some of Philip K. Dick's hack-work stinks to me of hack-work), but it deserves a showcase. So on with Rich's show.]
Rather than just respond to Jonathan, I should say what I think of Wolfe directly (although I'll probably be repeating myself from earlier in the thread). It's not that he's a bad writer. He's a second-rate writer, because he sets up expectations that he does not fulfill. Certain aspects of his books are good enough so that I am jolted out of the mindset of reading yet another work of commercial fantasy, and once I am, I discover that too much of the work remains inflected by commercial fantasy. With regard to the New Sun books, commonly regarded as his best series, I've already gone into the problems that I see in it: the classic and transparent plot devices, the puzzle-box authorial fiddling, the careless use of torture fetishism as a character booster.
I think that Scott is right that Wolfe has a single tone for many of his works (I haven't read them all -- just the five New Sun books, some of the short stories, the Swords books, and the Wizard Knight books), and it's a tone that enables him to indulge himself in his weaknesses. I'm sure that he really is interested in heroes who lose their memory, who have died and come back, who aren't who they think they are, and so on, but these characteristics of his protagonists also allow him a free hand with stage management, which he really should avoid allowing himself.
A writer should be judged on his best work, I suppose, and there are certainly writers who I think are first-rate (such as PKD) who have churned out some very inferior hackwork. But when PKD did hackwork, it always seemed like he was at least trying to be worthwhile, and I can't always say that for Wolfe. Case in point: the Wizard Knight books.
These two books are a pastiche, and he attempts to get around this by saying over and over that he knows it's a pastiche, he's doing it on purpose, it's a homage! But, just like Grunge in my quote above, that doesn't really make it any more than what it is. The rest of this comment will take the Wizard Knight books as an example; I don't think there are many plot revelations that you don't encounter early in the first book, but you have been warned.
The basic conceit of the books is taken from Yves Meynard's _The Book of Knights_ (a much better book). Wolfe credits Meynard in the acknowledgements. There is, as with the New Sun books, a creepy element added to increase that reader fascination that Jonathan talks about. In this case the protagonist is changed directly from a pre-teen into an adult so that he can make love to an elf queen, an act that would too obviously turn readers away in revulsion at child molestation if the protagonist was female. The gods are pastiche Norse; the nobility are pastiche Arthurian.
The first book is a mad scramble for plot tokens, collect them all: a bowstring, armor, a sword (it's Moorcock's Sword of the Dawn), a magical dog (it's Glen Cook's Toadkiller Dog), a magical cat (Gaiman), a magical flying horse (Wagner), and a large supporting cast of servants, allies, enemies, and lots of oaths so that the whole second book can be spent fulfilling them and answering people's questions.
And the politics, as always with Wolfe, are bad. It's the boy destined for greatness, the good (though manipulative) guys from above, the celestial and mundane hierarchy.
Basically, every major author has failures. But the very attempt at the Wizard Knight books is a sign that Wolfe isn't really trying.