The various
newspaper digitization projects have allowed intellectual historians an
unprecedented look into the codification of ideas. Previously, scholars
argued that, through the careful study of texts transmitted over the
wire, they could track the dissemination of a phrase from New York to
the Canadian wild. The problems with this approach were, first, that it
was an argument, not a comprehensive database; second, that it assumes
ideas transmit best in print; and third, that as an argument it relied
on a unidirectional model in which everything invariably flowed from
the same source, through the same channels, to the same destinations.
When common sense suggested otherwise, that is, when an idea clearly
originated in Savannah instead of New York, the means of dissemination
remained the same, only now the idea worked its way north to New York
before being routed into the same pool and distributed through the same
channels to same destinations.
I’m oversimplifying, obviously, and I’m not even trying to account
for concepts primarily transmitted via the spoken word. The Great
Awakening, for example, began anywhere people felt pain and had tents.
It spread down from upstate New York and up from Florida and out from
Appalachia with ease because it took the form of a common recognition,
as if everyone woke up one morning and convinced only God could improve
their awful lot. The lazy way to account for such mass recognitions
invokes the language of biological warfare: weaponized ideas
contaminate air and water alike, such that those who breathe what’s “in
the air” swiftly follow Derrida, while those who drink what’s “in the
water” embrace Foucault. Evidence that someone dumped a francophilic
compound into the cooling system or water supply never consists of an
epidemiological study of all breathers or drinkers; instead, we are
presented with a measurement, in decibels, of the howls produced by the
ecstatic afflicted. Measuring how intensely people predisposed to
shouting actually shout is not, I contend, the best means of discussing
the pervasiveness of a certain idea.
Suppose we wanted to know when Americans first came to realize that
wars to their distant east and west were not two very large conflicts
but one world-historical war. As mass realizations go, this one falls
under the category of ideas anyone could have had, had he but thought
about it a bit; and after 1 September 1939 everyone thought about it a
bit more. But they didn’t call it World War II or the Second World War.
Newspapers spoke of the Sino-Japanese War and the European War, but as
1939 came to a close, America does not seem to have connected the
two—at least not idiomatically. If you want to know when, precisely,
Americans understood they were in the midst of a second world war,
there are two ways to find out:
- find the first mention of “World War I” (not “the First World War,” for reasons I’ll explain shortly)
- find the first mention of “World War II” or “the Second World War”
Lest I seem too gushing about these databases, let me preface my
remarks on the first search by noting that finding relevant entries for
“world war i” in a database is a damn chore. Even when you limit the
search to the years in which the shift would’ve most likely
occurred—say, 1939 to 1941—you’re still presented thousands upon
thousands of false positives. You have your memoirs and editorials:
During the World War I enlisted for service and went to France . . .
You have your academic studies:
Fluctuation of the Populations During the World War I: Germany and France . . .
You have your OCR artifacts:

With all that noise, you might think it best to change the signal to
something louder but equally ordinal, like “the first world war,” but
then you encounter another difficulty: Americans, always a confident
lot, flipped fate the bird by referring to WWI as “the Great War” or
“the First World War.” They meant “the First World War” not as we do, i.e.
“the first of two,” but as “the first in which the entire world became
a combat theater.” Our best bet, then, would be to look for the first
appearances of “World War II” or “the Second World War.” So when did
Americans come to understand that the wars raging on opposite sides of
the globe were different aspects of a single conflict?
Not immediately. After Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, the LA Times wrote of “the European crisis” (”British Mobilize Army and Fleet,” 1) and the New York Times
provided “Bulletins on Europe’s Conflict” (1). By 2 September, the
United Press Syndicate noted that “[w]ithin a few hours the British and
French parliaments are likely to declare war on Adolf Hitler’s greater
German Reich and the second great world war may be under way (”Allies
Ready to Enter War,” 1) and Walter Lippmann’s “Estimate of the
Situation” was that the conflict would come to be known as either “the
European war” or “the white war” (LA Times, A4). Lippmann was
hesitant to call the conflict a world war because—presentist accounts
of eurocentrism to the contrary—most people refused to consider a war
fought by Britain, France, Germany and Italy sufficiently worldly.
Japan had taunted the British, but instead of continuing that fight,
Britain recalled the Royal Navy and, alongside the prides of the Polish fleet,
prepared for the European war. This meant the war would have a largely
European theater, because, as Lippmann wrote, “[t]he United States is
too strong for Japan.” The Sino-Japanese War would continue, but
because the western powers wouldn’t be drawn into it, this was to be a
fight for “mastery of the Old World,” not the whole world.
I lean heavily on Lippmann here, but only because he’s
representative of the consensus that was forming prior to Japan’s
attack on Changsha in late September 1939. The Chinese had been
stalling the Japanese by means of scorched earth and slow retreat: the
Japanese would “win” a battle by forcing the Chinese ever deeper into
their own briar patch. By early 1939, the Japanese Army was in such
disrepair that the threat of an American embargo effectively ended
Japanese hostilities against the British. The New York Times
reported that “[t]he impression in diplomatic circles was that Japan,
in view of the European war and the turn-about by Germany on the
Russian question, was feeling isolated and was turning toward the
United States” (”Japanese Bid Seen for U.S. Friendship,” 1). On 16
September, it seemed that on the basis of the alliances then being
hammered out, the conflict could not go global. Exploratory discussions
and mutual non-aggression pacts mean little once they end, but for the
moment it seemed as if the discussions were as fruitful as the pacts
were binding. Acting on the latter belief, Japan took advantage of its
pact with Russia to move troops from Manchukuoan border and resume
active hostitlities against China.
Thus on 19 September, Americans were faced with the European Crisis and the China Affair. In a letter to the editors of the Wall Street Journal,
Walter Parker urged that “[n]o matter what else the United States may
do to keep out of war, and to deal with the effects of World War No. 2,
it should prepare for the peace that will come some day” (”Letters to
the Editor,” 4). Catchy name, “World War No. 2,” and important because
it demonstrates that some people—even if they’re limited to Walter
Parker—had begun to think of the present wars as a singular sequel to
the earlier conflict. The sentiment was there, even if the locution was
clunky. In its 31 December edition, however, the LA Times would christen it proper:
Ill-omened and fateful, the year 1939 wove into the
pattern of history a chronicle of war and violence. Marking, as it did,
the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the World War, it became in
itself a starting point for the calculation in the future of the state
of “World War II.” (”Review of the Year,” A5).
It’d be better were it stripped of scare-quotes, but those
scare-quotes aren’t meaningless. They point to the tentativeness that
precedes any codification, and in such surveys, pointing is imoprtant.
Anyhow, I know these aren’t the first two iterations of the phrase, but
as the databases expand, so too will our ability to pinpoint the exact
historical moment when a thing became The Thing.
All of which is an extremely round-about way of asking when,
exactly, will we see “the Great Depression II” or “the Second Great
Depression” naked in a major media outlet? Moreover, when we feel like we ought to be, and how will future generations figure out when that was?
(x-posted.)
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